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I. INTRODUCTION 
Whether a severely impaired or critically ill infant should receive life· 
saving, and sometimes extraordinary, medical treatment, or be allowed to 
die, is hotly debated. The issue initially garnered public attention in 1982, 
when an infant who was born with Down's Syndrome, "Baby Doe," was 
allowed to die from a correctable birth defect. Following this, the federal 
government took a lead role in determining the fate of critically ill new-
borns. In the meantime, doctors, philosophers, and others l have debated 
whether federal interference in this area is appropriate. 
This essay will bring the reader up to date on the "Baby Doe" issue by 
summarizing the contours of the debate and explaining the legislation, in 
the form of amendments to the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment and 
Adoption Reform Act of 1978 (CAPTA),2 that ultimately resulted from 
the initial "Baby Doe" controversy.3 This essay also will add an addi-
tional voice to the discussion by criticizing federal intervention in this area 
• Deputy Assistant Dean and Professorial Lecturer in Law, George Wash-
ington University Law School; J.D., with honors, George Washington University 
Law School, 1993; B.A., cum laude, University of Massachusetts at Amherst, 
1990. Th author would like to acknowledge the helpful feedback and enthusiastic 
support of Professor Steven Schooner and Professor Amy Sloan of the George 
Washington University Law School. 
1. See COMPELLED COMPASSION: GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN THE TREAT-
MENT OF CRITICALLY ILL NEWBORNS (Arthur L. Caplan, et al. eds., 1992). 
2. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment and Adoption Reform Act of 1978, 
Pub. L. No. 93-247,88 Stat. 4 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5119a 
(1994 & Supp. III 1998)); see also Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 
98-457,98 Stat. 1749,42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5106 (1994). 
3. See infra notes 10-13 and accompanying text. 
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on three main grounds. 4 The first ground is that the federal government 
purports to solve a problem that largely does not exist, and in so doing, it 
oversimplifies the profound moral questions that surround the issue of 
whether to aggressively treat a severely impaired newborn.5 Secondly, 
federal intervention in this area through the CAPT A Amendments is bad 
policy because it eliminates parents from the treatment decision.6 Thirdly, 
the policy fails on a philosophical level because it does not square with 
our intuitions. 7 Finally, this essay will highlight a view that is largely 
missing from the debate on this issue - that of the practicing physicians 
who work with critically ill, severely impaired newborns and their parents 
every day. 8 The essay will conclude by briefly suggesting an alternative 
policy approach, which would presume that parents, in consultation with 
their doctors, are the appropriate decision-makers in these cases unless 
circumstances warrant otherwise.9 
II. THE FEDERAL POLICY MANDATING TIIE TREATMENT OF 
CRITICALL Y ILL NEWBORNS 
A. The History of the Baby Doe Controversy 
The issue of withdrawing or withholding treatment from critically ill 
newborns came on to the federal policy agenda in 1982, when an infant 
was born in Bloomington, Indiana, with Down's Syndrome and a tra-
cheoesophageal fistula. 1O Because of the fistula, the baby could not take 
nourishment orally. The condition was therefore life-threatening, but cor-
rectable by an operation that has a ninety percent chance of success. The 
doctors called in to treat "Baby Doe" wanted to transfer the infant to an-
other hospital and perform the life-saving surgery. 11 The obstetrician who 
delivered the baby, and the parents, took the position that treatment, in-
cluding food and water, should be withheld on the grounds that the child, 
because of its birth defects, would have a poor quality of life. 12 The hos-
pital ultimately took the matter to court. The judge ruled that the parents 
4. See infra note~ 65-95 and accompanying text. 
s. See infra notes 72-85 and accompanying text. 
6. See infra notes 65-69 and accompanying text. 
7. See infra notes 70-71 and accompanying text. 
s. See infra notes 72-94 and accompanying text. 
9. See infra notes 95-120 and accompanying text. 
10. See In the Matter of Treatment and Care of Infant Doe, No. GU-8204--
04A, ISSUES IN L. & MED., July 1986, at 77, 78 (1986) (Cir. Ct. Monroe County, 
Ind. Apr. 12, 1982). 
II. Seeid.at77-78. 
12. See id. at 78-79. 
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had the right to refuse treatment, and the child died six days after birth. 13 
Following this, the Reagan Administration quickly responded by fram-
ing the issue as one of discrimination against handicapped newborns. 14 
The Administration ordered the Department of Health and Human Serv-
ices (HHS) to issue a notice to hospitals receiving federal funds "remind-
ing" them that handicapped infants were protected by section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which prohibits discrimination against handi-
capped individuals by any program receiving federal financial 
assistance. 15 Thus, the Administration was attempting to step in and 
regulate under the authority of existing legislation, instead of waiting for 
(or proposing) legislation specifically addressing this issue. 
Shortly after the Administration's directive, HHS issued an "interim 
final rule" requiring hospitals to post in all maternity wards and nurseries 
a notice regarding the applicability of section 504 and the number of a 
telephone hotline for people to report suspected violations of the law to 
HHS.16 The interim rule also included, among other things, provisions for 
expedited actions, including full access to patient records, to determine 
compliance. 11 The interim rules were subsequently struck down because 
they were promulgated in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. 18 
A few months later, HHS issued new proposed rules regarding the treat-
ment of "handicapped" infants that were substantially similar to the in-
terim final rules. 19 The proposed rules included the same provisions re-
quiring the posting of notices in hospitals, expedited compliance actions, 
and access to patient records. 20 In addition, the proposed rules required 
state child protective agencies that received federal assistance to utilize 
their authority under state law to protect handicapped infants.21 The final 
13. See id. at 80. 
14. See Discrimination Against the Handicapped by Withholding Treatment or 
Nourishment; Notice of Health Care Providers, 47 Fed. Reg. 26,027 (1982); see 
also American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395, 397 (D.D.C. 
1983). 
15. See Discrimination Against the Handicapped by Withholding Treatment or 
Nourishment; Notice of Health Care Providers, 47 Fed. Reg. at 26,027; see also 
Heckler, 561 F. Supp. at 397. 
16. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap, 48 Fed. Reg. 9,630 
(1983) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 84) (proposed Mar. 7, 1983). 
11. See id. 
18. See Heckler, 561 F. Supp. at 404. 
19. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap Relating to Health Care 
for Handicapped Infants, 48 Fed. Reg. 30,846 (1983) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. 
pt. 84) (proposed July 5, 1983). 
20. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap Relating to Health Care 
for Handicapped Infants, 48 Fed. Reg. at 30,851. 
21. See id. 
346 NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:2 
rules took effect in 1984. 22 
In Bowen v. American Hospital Ass 'n,23 the Supreme Court struck down 
the final rules as unauthorized by the Rehabilitation Act. 24 In so doing, 
the Court noted the unprecedented nature of the federal government's 
regulations. The Court stated that "it is essential to understand the pre-
existing state law framework governing the provision of medical care to 
handicapped infants .... [S]tate law vests decisional responsibility in the 
parents, in the first instance, subject to review in exceptional cases by the 
State acting as parens patriae. ,,25 The Court went on to note that "prior to 
the regulatory activity culminating in the [f]inal [r]ules, the Federal Gov-
ernment was not a participant in the process of making treatment decisions 
for newborn infants. ,,26 
Further, the Court found that the basis "for federal intervention is per-
ceived discrimination against handicapped infants ... and yet [HHS] has 
pointed to no evidence that such discrimination occurs.,,27 The Court con-
cluded that federal regulation of health care providers in this area was 
inappropriate because in all cases where treatment was withheld or with-
drawn, it was done with parental consent. The Court stressed that a health 
care provider is not obligated or authorized to treat an infant without such 
consent. The Court stated that the Rehabilitation Act "does not authorize 
the Secretary to give unsolicited advice either to parents, to hospitals, or to 
state officials who are faced with difficult treatment decisions concerning 
handicapped children. ,,28 
In the meantime, in 1984 Congress stepped into the policy debate and 
passed amendments to the CAPT A which dealt with the issue of with-
holding treatment from critically ill newborns. 29 This recast the issue 
from one of discrimination against critically ill newborns to one of medi-
cal neglect. In effect, by addressing the issue in a statute dealing with 
prevention of child abuse, Congress equated parental decisions to limit 
treatment of severely impaired newborns with outright neglect. 
22. See Bowen v. American Hospital Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610, 622 (1986) (indi-
cating that judicial action regarding the government's authority to enforce the 
Final Rules had already been initiated and an appellate decision as to the merits of 
the case was rendered on February 23, 1984. This was "six weeks after the prom-
ulgation of the Final Rules"). 
23. 476 U.S. 610 (1986). 
24. See Bowen, 476 U.S. at 647. 
25. Id. at 627. 
26. Id. at 627-28. 
27. Id. at 643. 
28. Id. at 647. 
29. See Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-457, 98 Stat. 1749, 
42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5106 (1994). 
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The statute requires states seeking federal funds for child protective 
services to take certain steps to protect handicapped newborns. The stat-
ute provides, in pertinent part: 
the tenn 'withholding of medically indicated treatment' means the failure to 
respond to the infant's life-threatening conditions by providing treatment 
(including appropriate nutrition, hydration and medication) which, in the 
treating physician's or physicians' reasonable medical judgment, will be 
most likely to be effective in ameliorating or correcting all such conditions, 
except that the tenn does not include the failure to provide treatment ... to 
an infant when ... 
(A) the infant is chronically and irreversibly comatose; 
(B) the provision of such treatment would -
(i) merely prolong dying; 
(ii) not be effective in ameliorating or correcting all of the infant's 
life-threatening conditions; or 
(iii) otherwise be futile in tenns of the survival of the infant; or 
(C) the provision of such treatment would be virtually futile in tenns of 
the survival of the infant and the treatment itself under such circum-
stances would be inhumane. 30 
Thus, under the statute, withholding treatment is considered to be medical 
neglect unless the infant is in a permanent coma or death is essentially 
imminent and certain.31 In addition, parental input into the treatment deci-
sion is not contemplated by the statute. Indeed, the clear thrust of the 
statute is that any parental judgment short of treating the infant is consid-
ered neglect. 
The Department of Health and Human Services has issued regulations 
similar to those that were previously struck down implementing the 
CAPTA Amendments. The regulations track the statute's definition of 
"withholding of medically indicated treatment." In addition, the regula-
tions clarify that the term "infant" refers to a child of "less than one year 
of age. ,,32 By implication, then, after one year of age, parents and physi-
cians have discretion as to whether and how to treat a critically ill child. 33 
Indeed, the statute and regulations seem to suggest that when a child is 
30. 42 U.S.C. § 5 1 06 (g)(6) (1994 & Supp. III 1998). 
31. See 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B). "[M]edical neglect" includes "instances 
of withholding of medically indicated treatment from disabled infants with life-
threatening conditions." Id. 
32. 45 C.F.R. §1340.15 (b) (1997). 
33. See id. 
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under one year of age, there is a temptation, a dark impulse, on the part of 
the parents to simply let their critically ill infant die. Whether this is actu-
ally so is likely an issue best left to the mental health community. From a 
legal and policy perspective, however, it is unclear why this one-year 
carve out of federal regulation is necessary or in the best interests of the 
infant. In fact, as discussed below, it has unintended consequences that 
raise their own ethical issues. 
B. From Baby Doe to Baby K 
The CAPT A Amendments and implementing regulations are as far as 
the federal intervention in this area goes. Courts are very clear that 
CAPT A does not create a private right of action. 34 However, the debate 
over the treatment of critically ill infants has gone beyond CAPT A and 
played out in another federal statute, the Emergency Medical Treatment 
and Active Labor Act (EMT ALA). 35 EMT ALA was enacted to prevent 
"patient dumping," where a hospital does not treat or transfers a patient 
before giving stabilizing treatment because the patient is uninsured or oth-
erwise unable to pay.36 Ironically, the mandatory treatment of a critically 
ill infant under EMTALA, in at least one case, has turned on a parent's 
rig}:lt to make medical treatment decisions on behalf of a minor child, a 
right denied by the CAPT A Amendments. 
In the case of In re Baby K,37 a Virginia hospital sought a declaratory 
judgment and an injunction under EMT ALA and other federal and state 
statutes that it was not required to provide extraordinary medical treatment 
to an anencephalic baby whose mother repeatedly sought to have the baby 
resuscitated. 38 Because of her anencephaly, the baby had only· a brain 
stem, and she could not hear or see. She was permanently unconscious and 
had no hope of improving.39 The court noted that because of the baby's 
condition, the hospital urged the mother to permit a "Do Not Resuscitate 
Order" for Baby K, because further aggressive respiratory measures were 
medically inappropriate.40 The mother refused. The court noted that 
"[t]he mother opposes the discontinuation of ventilator treatment when 
Baby K experiences respiratory distress because she believes that all hu-
man life has value, including her anencephalic daughter's life. [The 
34. See Doe by Fein v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 861 (D.D.C. 1996). 
3.5. 42 U.S.C. §1395dd (1994). 
36. In re Baby K, 16 F.3d 590,593 (4th Cir. 1994); see also Brooks v. Mary-
land General Hospital, Inc., 996 F.2d 708, 710 (4th Cir. 1993). 
37. 832 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Va. 1993). 
38. See id. at 1023-27. 
39. See id. at 1025. 
40. See id. 
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mother] has a firm Christian faith that all life should be protected. She 
believes that God will work a miracle if that is his will. ,,41 Further, the 
court said that the mother "believes she has the right to decide what is in 
her child's best interests.',42 
The court stated that EMT ALA requires that any person who comes to 
the emergency department of a hospital with an emergency condition must 
be provided with stabilizing medical treatment.43 The court found that 
Baby K, when brought to the hospital in respiratory distress, was in an 
emergency condition, and under the plain meaning of the statute, the hos-
pital was required to stabilize her.44 The court rejected the hospital's ar-
gument that it did not have to stabilize her where, given the child's anen-
cephalic condition, such aggressive measures were "futile" and "inhu-
mane. ,,45 The court also held that Baby K was a disabled individual such 
that a refusal by the hospital to resuscitate her would violate the Rehabili-
tation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act.46 
The Founh Circuit affirmed the decision on the grounds that 
"EMTALA gives rise to a duty on the part of the hospital to provide respi-
ratory support to Baby K when she is presented at the hospital in respira-
tory distress and treatment is requested for her. ,,47 The court noted that 
there was nothing in the statute or legislative history to indicate that stabi-
lizing treatment did not have to be provided where the treatment "would 
exceed the prevailing standard of medical care," or where it is care that the 
treating physicians considered "morally and ethically inappropriate," as 
the Baby K physicians did.48 
C. Philosophical Underpinnings of the Federal Policy 
The federal policy is best understood in light of the moral theories 
which shaped it. The statute and the implementing regulations reflect 
what is called the "sanctity of life" view. This view "values human life 
independent of its capacities, holding that human dignity, worth, and 
sanctity are from God (in its religious form) or is naturally inherent (in its 
secular form).',49 Earl E. Shelp notes that the foundations for the "sanctity 
41. !d. at 1026. 
42. In re Baby K, 832 F. Supp. 1022, 1026 (E.D. Va. 1993). 
43. See id. at 1026-27. 
44. Id. at 1026. 
45. Id. at 1027. 
46. See id. at 1027-29. 
47. In re Baby K, 16 F.3d 590, 592 (4th Cir. 1994). 
48. Id. at 596. 
49. EARL E. SHELP, BORN TO DIE?: DECIDING THE FATE OF CRITICALLY ILL 
NEWBORNS 132 (1986). 
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of life" view are found in the Judeo-Christian tradition, which teaches that 
the value of life comes from God, not some "quality, capacity, trait, or 
property of life. ,,50 Therefore, proponents of the "sanctity of life" view 
believe that where there is human life, it is wrong to let it end. In the case 
of critically ill newborns, this view stresses the "equality of life" of each 
infant. As Robert Weir explains, "[g]ranted that some infants are born 
with severe mental and physical defects, they are not to be judged as being 
inferior in some sense merely because of their defects. Instead, decisions 
about treatment options should be made from a perspective that empha-
sizes 'the equality of particular lives regardless of their state or condi-
tion. ",51 
Proponents of the "sanctity of life" view believe that any principle short 
of protecting and preserving every life would lead to a slippery slope, 
whereby some individuals would be allowed to die (or be killed) because 
they are disabled or disadvantaged in some way. Indeed, they argue that 
decisions about whether to treat a critically ill newborn should not be 
made with reference to the infant's quality of life. As Weir explains, 
when parents look at "quality of life" factors two problems occur. First, a 
birth-defective neonate inevitably loses out in the comparison with a nor-
mal infant who will have "a life worth living." Second, a birth-defective 
neonate's life is further devalued when it becomes clear that "quality of 
expected life ... entails in principle the view that a particular human life 
is replaceable by another. ,,52 
The "sanctity of life" view, and accordingly the federal policy, thus 
explicitly reject any consideration of an infant's "quality of life" in mak-
ing treatment decisions. In fact, it presumes that to the one living it, any 
type of life is worth living, even if it is filled with severe pain and disabil-
ity, mental anguish, and, in some cases, an inability to even recognize or 
appreciate that a life is being lived. 
As a philosophical approach, the "quality of life" view, like the "sanc-
tity of life" position, recognizes human life as a value. The "quality of 
life" view differs, however, in that it recognizes distinctions in the type of 
life a severely impaired newborn who is "saved" may have, compared to a 
child that is healthy. Shelp explains that advocates of the "quality of life" 
position "search for and weigh or order the features, qualities, properties, 
or capacities of human life that make it of worth for the one who lives 
it. ,,53 
50. Id. 
51. ROBERT F. WEIR, SELECTIVE NONTREATMENT OF HANDICAPPED NEW-
BORNS: MORAL DILEMMAS IN NEONATAL MEDICINE 148 (1984). 
52. WEIR, supra note 51, at 147-48. 
53. SHELP, supra note 49, at 135-36. 
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Weir further explains that under this view, some human beings have life 
in the sense that they have '''vital and metabolic processes with no human 
functioning. ",54 Other human beings, indeed most human beings, have 
"life" in quite a different sense: "'a state of human functioning (or capac-
ity thereof), of well being.' When parents and physicians have this under-
standing, they realize that there are times in which it is wrong to preserve 
'the life of one with no capacity for those aspects of life that we regard as 
human. ",55 Accordingly, proponents of the "quality of life" view recog-
nize that in some cases, it is merciful to let the infant die - survival is an 
injustice. 56 
Thus, the current federal policy, in mandating treatment in almost every 
case where death of the infant is not imminent, reflects a "sanctity of life" 
view, and eliminates any consideration of the burden on the infant or its 
quality of life. 
III. Is FEDERALLY-MANDA TED TREATMENT OF CRITICALLY ILL 
NEWBORNS GOOD POLICY? 
In answering this question, it is helpful to look at the primary arguments 
for and against the policy, and examine a view that is often left out of the 
policy debate - that of the health care providers who treat critically ill 
newborns every day. 
A. Arguments for the Federal Policy 
Arguments for the federal policy generally come down to an assertion 
that there is a grave problem of discrimination against critically ill infants, 
and that a strong policy valuing all human life, in all circumstances, is 
therefore necessary. This view is best characterized by a report from the 
United States Commission on Civil Rights, entitled "Medical Discrimina-
tion Against Children with Disabilities" (Commission Report).57 The 
Commission's purpose was to '''attempt to determine the nature and extent 
of the practice of withholding medical treatment or nourishment from 
handicapped infants and to examine the appropriate role for the Federal 
Government. ",58 The Commission noted that its report: 
54. WEIR, supra note 51, at 165. 
55. Id. 
56. See id. at 161. 
57. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, MEDICAL DISCRIMINATION AGAINST 
CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES (1989) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT). 
58. Id. at 1. 
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focuses solely on the question of discrimination, addressing medical services 
provided or required to be provided, that are withheld from individuals with 
disabilities precisely because of their disabilities. It is neither the province 
nor the purpose of the Commission to oversee, evaluate, or question the ex-
ercise of legitimate medical judgment inherent in decision making concern-
. d· I t 59 mg me lca treatmen. 
This deceptively simple statement could not hide the true position of the 
Commission - that any "legitimate medical judgment" not to treat was 
discrimination, and therefore not "legitimate" at all. 
The Commission Report stated that "[t]he Commission is convinced 
that the evidence supports a finding that discriminatory denial of medical 
treatment, food, and fluids is and has been a significant civil rights prob-
lem for infants with disabilities."6O The Commission concluded that its 
inquiry "leaves no doubt" that newborns "have been denied food, water, 
and medical treatment solely because they are, or are perceived to be, dis-
abled. ,,61 In so concluding, the Commission dismissed the views of those 
who argued for allowing parental discretion in making treatment deci-
sions, along with consideration ofthe infant's quality of life, as grounded 
in ignorance. The Commission Report stated that "the arguments typically 
advanced to support denial of lifesaving medical treatment, food, and flu-
ids based on disability are often grounded in misinformation, inaccurate 
stereotypes, and negative attitudes about people with disabilities.,,62 The 
Commission focused heavily on children with Down's Syndrome to un-
derscore "the good lives that people with disabilities can have when barri-
ers to their full integration are decreased, adequate access is established to 
education and employment, and pessimistic prognostications are not per-
mitted to become self-fulfilling prophecies. ,,63 
The Commission thus strongly supported the federal policy. Indeed, in 
the Commission's view, the policy did not go far enough, and was not 
adequately enforced by HHS. The Commission stated "[i]f adequately 
enforced, the law would provide strong protection for many children with 
disabilities against denial of lifesaving treatment.,,64 
59. Jd. at 2. 
60. !d. at 12 (emphasis added). 
61. Jd. at 3. 
62. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 57, at 3. 
63. Jd. at 34. 
64. Jd. at 7. 
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B. Arguments Against the Federal Policy. 
Despite the endorsement of the United States Commission on Civil 
Rights, and others, the federal policy has received significant criticism. 
This criticism has focused on two main areas: (1) the policy eliminates 
parental discretion in making treatment decisions; and (2) it fails to con-
sider the burdens on infants that treatment can impose. 
Professor Stephen A. Newman, in arguing that the federal policy may 
be unconstitutional, notes that "underlying the statute seems to be a view 
of parents as suspect bystanders, presumptively ready to commit child 
abuse by depriving their infants of necessary medical care. ,,65 Similarly, 
John Arras also argues that the federal policy is indefensible because it 
ignores the parent's role. He states that ''the only discretion accorded to 
parents by this Act is the 'discretion' to treat.,,66 Arras further states that 
''the Act regards parental participation in such decisions to be tantamount 
to child abuse. ,,67 This view is further echoed by Professor Dale L. 
Moore, who states that under the federal policy, "parental choices in favor 
of nontreatment . . . are suspect and perhaps unworthy of the deference 
traditionally accorded to parental decisions. The reason seems to lie in a 
concern that such nontreatment decisions may be tainted .... ,,68 Many 
others have made similar arguments. 69 
The second main objection to the federal policy is that it fails to allow 
for considerations of the burdens on, and suffering of, the critically ill 
newborn. Newman states that the federal policy "set[s] a norm for aggres-
sive, even relentless, treatment, with little regard for the suffering and 
grave burdens such aggressive care may generate. ,,70 Likewise, noting 
that the IllIS regulations only allow for nontreatment essentially where 
death is imminent, Arras states that the federal policy would "appear to 
require corrective surgery on the esophageal atresia of a Trisomy-13 or -
18 infant, despite the severity of his underlying defect and his predictably 
brief life - a requirement that flies in the face of current medical practice 
65. Stephen A. Newman, Baby Doe, Congress and the States: Challenging the 
Federal Treatment Standard for Impaired Infants, 15 AM. 1. LAW & MEo. 5 
(1989). This paper will not explore the technical legal objections, discussed by 
Professor Newman and others, to the current legislative and regulatory scheme. 
66. John D. Arras, Ethical Principles for the Care of Imperiled Newborns: 
Toward an Ethic of Ambiguity, in WHICH BABIES SHALL LIVE? 83, 127 (Thomas H. 
Murray & Arthur L. Caplan eds. 1985). 
67. Id. 
68. Dale L. Moore, Challenging Parental Decisions to Overtreat Children, 5 
HEALTH MATRIX 311, 318 (1995). 
69. See, e.g., JEFF LYON, PLAYING GOD IN THE NURSERY (1985). 
70. Newman, supra note 65, at 2. 
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and moral common sense. ,,71 
C. The Clinical View 
Essentially missing from the debate is data from the medical community 
on what really happens in the neonatal intensive care nursery. The physi-
cians who work with critically ill newborns every day provide enormous 
insight into whether the current federal law makes for good policy. 
Looking at the policy from the caregivers' perspective highlights two sig-
nificant issues. First, the CAPT A Amendments and implementing regula-
tions are simply unnecessary. Second, this seemingly unnecessary legisla-
tion has the unintended effect of mandating what physicians, and likely 
the general public, would consider unethical over-treatment. 
In a recent study, Dr. Stephen Wall and Dr. John Partridge reviewed the 
records of a university-based intensive care nursery over a period of three 
years "[t]o determine the frequency of selective nontreatment of extremely 
premature, critically ill, or malformed infants ... and to determine the 
reasons documented by neonatologists for their decisions to withdraw or 
withhold treatment.,,72 Doctors Wall and Partridge noted that in light of 
the controversy surrounding the ethics and legality of limiting treatment 
for critically ill newborns, "knowledge of current clinical practices is an 
essential element in the discussion. ,,73 This element, however, is fre-
quently left out. As previously noted, in the Commission Report, the 
clinical realities were only selectively considered, with an emphasis on 
newborns with Down's Syndrome, and not accurately analyzed. 74 
The authors found that over the three-year period, 165 infants died 
among the 1609 admitted. 75 One hundred eight deaths "followed with-
drawal of life support, [thirteen] deaths followed the withholding of treat-
ment, and [forty-four] occurred while infants continued to receive maxi-
mal life-sustaining treatment. ,,76 The authors concluded that in cases 
where death followed withdrawal or withholding treatment, "the most 
frequently documented reason for limiting life support was the neonatolo-
gist's belief that continued treatment was futile in the face of imminent 
death, noted in 74% of these deaths. ,,77 In 51 % of the deaths, the authors 
71. Arras, supra note 66, at 127-28. 
72. Stephen N. Wall, M.D. & John Colin Partridge, M.D., Death in the Inten-
sive Care Nursery: Physician Practice of Withdrawing and Withholding Life Sup-
port, PEDIATRICS, Jan. 1997, at 64. 
73. Wall & Partridge, supra note 72, at 65. 
74. See generally COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 57, at 27-31. 
75. See Wall & Partridge, supra note 72, at 64. 
76. Id. 
77. !d. at 66. 
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noted that "quality of life concerns" was documented as a reason to limit 
treatment. 78 "Quality of life" concerns included the prognosis for severe 
disabilities and the belief that the infant would unnecessarily suffer as a 
result of continued treatment. The authors further found that "quality of 
life" concerns, exclusive of any reference to the futility of treatment were 
noted in 23% of the deaths attributable to withdrawing or withholding 
treatment. ,,79 Of these deaths, the overwhelming majority of the infants 
(96%) suffered from either hypoxic-ischemic encelopathy or intracranial 
hemorrhage. 80 
Also insightful is the fact that the authors found that in all of the deaths, 
the treatment withdrawn or withheld was intubation and mechanical ven-
tilation.8l None of the deaths were attributable to the withdrawal or with-
holding of fluids. 82 Moreover, in the overwhelming majority of deaths, 
withdrawal of ongoing therapy that was deemed ineffective and inappro-
priate was more common than withholding treatment. 83 The authors con-
cluded that "the practice of selective nontreatment described at our insti-
tution may be typical of other tertiary care nurseries in the United 
States. ,,84 The authors stated that despite the efforts of the federal gov-
ernment in the wake of the Baby Doe controversy, "[n]either governmen-
tal regulations ... nor court decisions have resolved these moral and ethi-
cal questions. ,,85 
Thus, according to this study, the law and regulations that serve to re-
solve this issue are not grounded in reality. Indeed, this study does not 
paint a picture of widespread discrimination or tainted parental decision-
making, but instead illustrates that, not surprisingly, cases involving criti-
cally ill newborns are complex, posing serious ethical questions. Many of 
these cases push the bounds of our medical knowledge. As such, the 
moral questions are even more complex, and the parents and physicians 
find themselves in uncharted territory. Such an area is not appropriate for 
federal intervention. 
The physicians' perspective also highlights the unintended, and argua-
bly unethical consequence of CAPTA and the implementing regulations: 
78. See id. 
79. Id. 
80. See Wall & Partridge, supra note 72, at 66. The fact that "quality of life" 
concerns are reflected in physician's treatment decisions indicates that the federal 
policy may have little effect in everyday life. Nevertheless, the issue is not simply 
academic - the statute and regulations are still the law. 
8!. See Wall & Partridge, supra note 72, at 66. 
82. See id. 
83. See id. 
84. Id. at 68. 
85. Id. at 69. 
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aggressive overtreatment that results in a prolonged, painful death. 86 A 
recent article by the American Academy of Pediatrics addressed the issue 
of the "profound moral questions" involved in providing treatment to 
critically ill newborns. 81 The Academy pointed out that the public policy 
measures enacted to protect disabled infants may have had "unintended 
consequences. ,,88 The Academy states that "attention concentrated on 
saving the lives of infants, some with permanent, severe disabilities or 
neurogenerative disorders, has hampered sufficient attention to the possi-
ble overuse of [life-sustaining medical technology]. ,,89 The Academy 
noted that after the CAPT A Amendments, "surveys of neonatologists in-
dicated that many . . . believe[ d] they were legally constrained to provide 
life-sustaining medical treatment to infants even where their medical 
judgments and the views of the parents concur that withholding treatment 
is preferable. ,,90 The Academy stated that the evidence "continues to indi-
cate that the decreased mortality brought about by neonatal intensive care 
has been accompanied by increased morbidity, i.e., serious mental and 
physical limitations among survivors that impose burdens on affected 
children and their families. ,>91 
Perhaps most striking is the Academy's view that "no reliable evidence 
that decisions endangering children have been widespread exists.,,92 The 
Academy asserted that the Baby Doe controversy of the 1980s gave the 
false impression that parents and physicians commonly withhold treatment 
from critically ill newborns who could be saved.93 In fact, the Academy 
stated that "[m]ost cases of lethal nontreatment ... [involve] infants with 
trisomy 21 and myelomeningocele.,,94 
Thus, from the perspective of the medical community, the federal policy 
has done little to resolve the issue of whether it is appropriate to withhold 
or withdraw treatment from critically ill newborns. Indeed, the policy ad-
dresses a "discrimination" problem that largely does not exist. In so do-
ing, the federal policy requires doctors to continue treatment even where, 
in the physician's view, continued treatment is unethical and not in the 
infant's best interests. 
86. See American Academy of Pediatrics, Ethics and Care of Critically III 
Infants and Children. PEDIATRICS, July 1996, at 149; see also Wall & Partridge, 
supra note 72, at 64-65. 
87. American Academy of Pediatrics, supra note 86, at 149. 
88. Id. 
89. ld. 
90. ld. at 149-50. 
91. Id. at 150. 
92. American Academy of Pediatrics, supra note 86, at 150 
93. See id. 
94. Id. 
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It appears, then, that seventeen years after the death of Baby Doe, the 
issue is far from settled, despite the federal government's attempts to es-
tablish a policy. At the time the federal government intervened in this 
area, there was no moral consensus on the issue of treatment for critically 
ill newborns. We are no closer now, despite the federal government's 
attempt at setting a uniform moral vision. One thing, however, is certain. 
As the Supreme Court noted in Bowen, it is unprecedented for the federal 
government to be involved in treatment decisions for newborns. 95 Thus, 
the questions we are left with are: (1) is it good policy; and (2) if not, what 
is? 
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS 
The federal statute and implementing regulations that mandate treat-
ment of critically ill newborns is bad policy. This is so for three reasons. 
First, the policy purports to resolve a problem of "discrimination" that 
largely does not exist. Second, in setting a uniform federal standard, the 
policy dramatically oversimplifies the complex moral and ethical issues 
presented by the decision of whether to treat a critically ill newborn. 
Third, as a philosophical matter, the policy does not square with our intui-
tions. 
As the American Academy of Pediatrics explained, and the Supreme 
Court noted in its opinion in Bowen, there is no evidence that there in fact 
exists a "problem" of discriminatory or otherwise unjust withdrawing or 
withholding medical treatment from critically ill newborns. 96 There is no 
question that there were a few well-publicized cases in the 1980s that, to 
the outside observer, involved unjust withholding of medical treatment. 
However, the evidence shows that these cases were not representative of 
what actually goes on in neonatal intensive care nurseries.97 Thus, the 
federal policy rests on a foundation not of necessity and fact, but exag-
geration and hysteria. 
In addition, the federal policy drastically oversimplifies the issue of 
withdrawal or withholding medical treatment from critically ill newborns. 
This is clear from the first federal initiative in this area, when the Reagan 
Administration framed the issue as one of "discrimination" against 
"handicapped" newborns. 98 The court in In re Baby K relied on much of 
the same reasoning. In casting the issue in this light, the federal govern-
ment made the issue appear to be as simple as other issues involving dis-
95. See Bowen v. American Hospital Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610,627-28 (1986). 
96. See generally American Academy of Pediatrics, supra note 86, at 149. 
97. See Wall & Partridge, supra note 72, at 64-65; American Academy of 
Pediatrics, supra note 86, at 150. 
98. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
358 NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:2 
abled individuals. Policymakers were thus able to shoehorn the newborn 
issue into the general consensus against discrimination against the dis-
abled. Yet this issue is far different from the question of whether an oth-
erwise qualified disabled individual is entitled to a job or whether an indi-
vidual in a wheelchair is entitled to access to public accommodations. 
Most of us would agree that denying employment and access to handi-
capped individuals is simply wrong. In contrast, most of us would not as 
quickly come to a consensus on whether a newborn infant, who faces a 
life (perhaps guaranteed to end prematurely) of severe physical and mental 
disabilities, and painful, burdensome medical treatment, should be kept 
alive. Arras, in arguing for an "ethic of ambiguity," stresses this point. He 
states that: 
By attempting to erect an entire social policy on the slender reed of a few 
miscarriages of justice, [the federal policy] burdens the American people 
with a hopelessly simplistic rule. As we shall see, the Infant Doe Rule over-
simplifies an extraordinarily complex moral and factual situation. Adequate 
social policy needs to be formulated on the basis of a broad understanding of 
moral and medical realities, not on moral outrage directed, no matter how 
appropriately, against a few highly publicized cases.99 
The advocates of the federal policy, as demonstrated by the Commis-
sion Report, dismiss this more difficult, and realistic, presentation of the 
issue. Instead, borrowing from traditional arguments made on behalf of 
the disabled community, the advocates argue that the real problem is sim-
ply one of ignorance, stereotypes, and plain discrimination. lOo Yet it is 
clear that this issue is not as simple as whether a child with Down's Syn-
drome will lead a productive, fulfilling life, as the Commission Report 
repeatedly stressed. 101 Indeed, as the American Academy of Pediatrics 
noted, the case of "Baby Doe" was an exception, not the rule.102 Moreo-
ver, medical evidence shows that the overwhelming majority of critically 
ill newborns who are aggressively treated are severely impaired for the 
rest of their lives. 103 This fact cannot and should not be overlooked. 
My previous two objections to the federal policy underscore the final, 
and most important problem with it: the policy does not comport with our 
intuition. First, it cuts parents out of the decision of whether to treat their 
99. Arras, supra note 66, at 99. 
100. See COMMISSION REpORT, supra note 57, at 12-17,103-10. 
101. See id. at 36. 
102. See American Academy of Pediatrics, supra note 86, at 149 
103. See American Academy of Pediatrics, supra note 86, at 150; see also su-
pra note 91 and accompanying text. 
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critically ill children. Regardless of whether someone embraces the sanc-
tity of life or quality of life view (or something in between), that person 
would almost certainly accept that as a general matter, parents should be 
the primary decision-makers on behalf of their children. In fact, the case 
of In re Baby K turned on such a view. 104 Eliminating parents from the 
decision-making equation breaks with well-established legal tradition and 
quite simply, the reality of the situation. As Professor Newman notes, 
"[b]oth law and society regard parents as the primary protectors of their 
child's best interests. ,,105 Indeed, the Supreme Court has long recognized 
that parents are presumed to be the appropriate decision-makers on behalf 
of their minor children. 106 
Moreover, as others have noted, the reality of the situation concerning 
critically ill newborns is that parents suffer. Indeed, if their severely im-
paired children are kept alive, the families often face a lifetime of burden 
and suffering - emotionally and financially. Although it intervenes to 
the point of mandating that critically ill, severely impaired infants should 
be aggressively treated, the federal government is far less willing to pro-
vide assistance and social programs to infants who manage to survive and 
grow up to be severely handicapped individuals. For this reason, many 
ethicists have argued that the "plight of parents" must be considered, and 
they should not be cut out of the decision-making process.107 The federal 
policy, however, is framed with suspicion toward parents. Instead of rec-
ognizing that most parents, in all but rare cases, agonize over decisions to 
treat their critically ill newborns and in many cases insist on what physi-
cians would consider unethical over-treatment, the federal policy casts 
them in a suspicious light, as "interested" parties whose interests will 
"taint" the decision-making process. Yet our intuition tells us that "direct 
killing and euthanasia are never part of a relationship that should exist 
between parents and newborns. ,,108 This intuition has been recognized by 
the Supreme Court, which noted that the "natural bonds of affection lead 
parents to act in the best interests of their children."I09 By the same token, 
our intuition also tells us that parents should have a say in the treatment 
decision. I 10 
104. See In re Baby K, 832 F. Supp. 1022, 1030-31 (ED. Va. 1993). 
105. Newman, supra note 62, at 5. 
106. See Bowen v. American Hospital Ass'n, 476 U.S. at 627-28; see a/so Wis-
consin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1972); Parham v. 1.R., 442 U.S. 584,602 
(1979). 
107. WEIR, supra note 51, at 159. 
108. WEIR, supra note 51, at 161. 
109. Parham, 442 U.S. at 602. 
110. See SHELP, supra note 49, at 140; see a/so American Academy of Pediat-
rics, supra note 86, at 150-51. 
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Also showing that the federal policy does not square with our intuitions, 
is its failure to consider the infant's suffering in the face of continued 
treatment and the infant's quality of life if it survives. The federal policy 
erroneously assumes that a presumption in favor of "life" is always in an 
infant's best interests. In fact, we know this is not true. As noted by the 
medical community, the issue of aggressive over-treatment presents an 
important ethical dilemma, one not simply overlooked by the federal pol-
icy but likely borne out of it. As stressed by Professor Moore, "demands 
for over-treatment that disregard a child's best interests should be chal-
lenged and resisted. ,,111 
Moreover, as Shelp argues, considerations of the infant's quality of life 
are consistent with the values of society.1J2 This view is also echoed by 
Newman, who states that "[g]iven the potential for grave burdens accom-
panying treatment, infants, like all other incompetent individuals, deserve 
the right'to have harms to themselves given full consideration .... ,,113 
Newman goes on to state that "[l]egal, medical, and ethical thinking sup-
port the centrality of a benefitslburdens analysis" to come up with a treat-
ment decision. 114 
This is consistent with the view taken by at least some courts. For in-
stance, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals recently upheld the de-
cision of a lower court, acting as parens patriae, to enter a Do Not Resus-
citate (DNR) order for a neglected two year old who was in a comatose 
state and "'neurologically devastated. ,,,115 The court found that despite 
the mother's wishes for "aggressive resuscitation" efforts to be used in the 
event K.I., as predicted, developed respiratory distress, "[the child's] 'best 
interests would be served by issuing a DNR order. ",116 The court noted 
that the mother's refusal to consent was "unreasonable and contrary" to 
the child's well being, given the child's condition and the fact that aggres-
sive treatment would cause the child pain without any hope of future re-
covery.117 
Thus, cases such as In re K.J. and In re Baby K show the other side of 
the moral equation - a side that the federal policy does not contemplate. 
Assuming, as the federal policy does, that parents may have a selfish de-
sire to let their infant die, there is an equally if not more plausible desire 
for some parents to selfishly demand aggressive, painful treatment for 
Ill. Moore, supra note 68, at 315. 
112. See SHELP, supra note 49, at 69. 
113. Newman, supra note 65, at 40. 
114. Id. 
115. In re K.l., B.l., and D.M., 735 A.2d 448, 450 (D.C. 1999). 
116. Id. at 452. 
117. Id. at 456. 
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their doomed infant. This desire to continue the biological life of an in-
fant for the parents well being, :'5 opposed to the infant's, was likely at 
work in In re KI and In re Baby K. Ironically, the neglected K.I. may 
have had her interests better served than Baby K because the court was 
free to consider K.I. 's interests. I IS 
While proponents of the federal policy criticize "quality of life" consid-
erations of this kind as based on ignorance and discrimination, and see 
mandatory treatment as always in an infant's best interests, the benefits to 
the infant are often illusory. The truth is that nearly all of us, the propo-
nents of the federal policy included, hold such issues to be important in 
our daily lives. We routinely speak of spending "quality time" with our 
children. In choosing jobs, we often cite "quality of life" issues as being 
important to our decisions. Such considerations permeate most everything 
that we do. In short, the "sanctity of life" position, as embodied in the 
federal policy mandating treatment of critically ill newborns, is divorced 
from the realities of our daily life. 
What would be an acceptable policy? As an initial matter, I advocate 
eliminating the federal role in making treatment decisions that affect se-
verely impaired newborns. To the extent there is a need to protect against 
the rare parents who would sanction the killing of their newborn on inap-
propriate grounds, and against accepted medical judgment, the states have 
a child protective system in place to deal with these cases. Thus, I would 
return to a system where parents, in consult with their physician, are pre-
sumed to be the best parties to make decisions about whether to withdraw 
or withhold medical treatment. This presumption would not be irrebu-
table. As stated above, in the event parents demonstrated they were not 
acting within the area of reasonable parental discretion, the states have 
child protective mechanisms that may be invoked. This position is advo-
cated by many others, including the American Academy of Pediatrics, 
which states that: 
the AAP believes that parents and physicians should make reasoned deci-
sions together about critically ill infants using the principles of informed pa-
rental permission ... [s ]uch decisions should consider the benefits and bur-
dens of treatment alternatives. . .. In rare instances, as required by law and 
sound ethical standards, it may be necessary to invoke established child 
protective mechanisms if parents wish to forego [life-saving medical treat-
ment], physicians disagree, and the parties cannot resolve their differences 
118. Id. at 453-56 (applying the "best interest of the child standard" instead of 
the "substituted judgment test" because the baby's parents disagree over the proper 
course of action and the baby "will forever lack, the ability to express a prefer-
ence"). 
362 NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:2 
with help from subspecialists, ethics consultants, or ethics committees. 119 
Thus, the issue of whether to treat critically ill newborns should not be 
swept aside with a simplistic social policy that overlooks the profound 
ethical, medical, and legal questions that such situations pose. Because of 
the unique and complex issues that each critically ill newborn presents, 
parents, working with their doctors, families, clergy, and others, are in the 
first instance the best decision-makers. 
119. American Academy of Pediatrics, supra note 86, at 150. 
